THE FEDERALIST PAPERS by Subject
The Federalist Papers are a series of 85 articles or essays advocating the ratification of the United States Constitution. Seventy-seven of the essays were published serially in The Independent Journal and The New York Packet between October 1787 and August 1788. A compilation of these and eight others, called The Federalist; or, The New Constitution, was published in two volumes in 1788 by J. and A. McLean. The series’ correct title is The Federalist; the title The Federalist Papers did not emerge until the twentieth century.
The Federalist remains a primary source for interpretation of the U.S. Constitution, as the essays outline a lucid and compelling version of the philosophy and motivation of the proposed system of government. The authors of The Federalist wanted both to influence the vote in favor of ratification and to shape future interpretations of the Constitution. Thomas Jefferson called the Federalist Papers the best commentary ever written about the principles of government.
This version of the Federalist Papers contains the full text of the essay followed by a summary or short version.
The Federalist remains a primary source for interpretation of the U.S. Constitution, as the essays outline a lucid and compelling version of the philosophy and motivation of the proposed system of government. The authors of The Federalist wanted both to influence the vote in favor of ratification and to shape future interpretations of the Constitution. Thomas Jefferson called the Federalist Papers the best commentary ever written about the principles of government.
This version of the Federalist Papers contains the full text of the essay followed by a summary or short version.
The Federalist Papers (By Subject - link below)
# Date Title
1 1787 Oct 27 General Introduction
2 1787 Oct 31 Concerning Dangers from Foreign Force and Influence
3 1787 Nov 3 Concerning Dangers from Foreign Force and Influence (continued)
4 1787 Nov 7 Concerning Dangers from Foreign Force and Influence (continued)
5 1787 Nov 10 Concerning Dangers from Foreign Force and Influence (continued)
6 1787 Nov 14 Concerning Dangers from Dissensions Between the States
7 1787 Nov 15 Concerning Dangers from Dissensions Between the States (continued) and Particular Causes Enumerated
8 1787 Nov 20 Consequences of Hostilities Between the States
9 1787 Nov 21 The Utility of the Union as a Safeguard Against Domestic Faction and Insurrection
10 1787 Nov 22 The Utility of the Union as a Safeguard Against Domestic Faction and Insurrection (continued)
11 1787 Nov 24 The Utility of the Union in Respect to Commercial Relations and a Navy
12 1787 Nov 27 The Utility of the Union In Respect to Revenue
13 1787 Nov 28 Advantage of the Union in Respect to Economy in Government
14 1787 Nov 30 Objections to the Proposed Constitution From Extent of Territory Answered
15 1787 Dec 1 Insufficiency of the Present Confederation to Preserve the Union
16 1787 Dec 4 Insufficiency of the Present Confederation to Preserve the Union (continued)
17 1787 Dec 5 Insufficiency of the Present Confederation to Preserve the Union (continued)
18 1787 Dec 7 Insufficiency of the Present Confederation to Preserve the Union (continued)
19 1787 Dec 8 Insufficiency of the Present Confederation to Preserve the Union (continued)
20 1787 Dec 11 Insufficiency of the Present Confederation to Preserve the Union (continued)
21 1787 Dec 12 Other Defects of the Present Confederation
22 1787 Dec 14 Other Defects of the Present Confederation (continued)
23 1787 Dec 18 Necessity of a Government as Energetic as the One Proposed to the Preservation of the Union
24 1787 Dec 19 Powers Necessary to the Common Defense Further Considered
25 1787 Dec 21 Powers Necessary to the Common Defense Further Considered (continued)
26 1787 Dec 22 Idea of Restraining the Legislative Authority in Regard to the Common Defense Considered
27 1787 Dec 25 Idea of Restraining the Legislative Authority in Regard to the Common Defense Considered (continued)
28 1787 Dec 26 Idea of Restraining the Legislative Authority in Regard to the Common Defense Considered (continued)
29 1788 Jan 9 Concerning the Militia
30 1787 Dec 28 Concerning the General Power of Taxation
31 1788 Jan 1 Concerning the General Power of Taxation (continued)
32 1788 Jan 2 Concerning the General Power of Taxation (continued)
33 1788 Jan 2 Concerning the General Power of Taxation (continued)
34 1788 Jan 5 Concerning the General Power of Taxation (continued)
35 1788 Jan 5 Concerning the General Power of Taxation (continued)
36 1788 Jan 8 Concerning the General Power of Taxation (continued)
37 1788 Jan 11 Concerning the Difficulties of the Convention in Devising a Proper Form of Government
38 1788 Jan 12 The Same Subject Continued, and the Incoherence of the Objections to the New Plan Exposed
39 1788 Jan 16 Conformity of the Plan to Republican Principles
40 1788 Jan 18 On the Powers of the Convention to Form a Mixed Government Examined and Sustained
41 1788 Jan 19 General View of the Powers Conferred by The Constitution
42 1788 Jan 22 The Powers Conferred by the Constitution Further Considered
43 1788 Jan 23 The Powers Conferred by the Constitution Further Considered (continued)
44 1788 Jan 25 Restrictions on the Authority of the Several States
45 1788 Jan 26 Alleged Danger From the Powers of the Union to the State Governments Considered
46 1788 Jan 29 The Influence of the State and Federal Governments Compared
47 1788 Jan 30 The Particular Structure of the New Government and the Distribution of Power Among Its Different Parts
48 1788 Feb 1 These Departments Should Not Be So Far Separated as to Have No Constitutional Control Over Each Other
49 1788 Feb 2 Method of Guarding Against the Encroachments of Any One Department of Government by Appealing to the People
Through a Convention
50 1788 Feb 5 Periodical Appeals to the People Considered
51 1788 Feb 6 The Structure of the Government Must Furnish the Proper Checks and Balances Between the Different Departments
52 1788 Feb 8 The House of Representatives
53 1788 Feb 9 The House of Representatives (continued)
54 1788 Feb 12 Apportionment of Members of the House of Representatives Among the States
55 1788 Feb 13 The Total Number of the House of Representatives
56 1788 Feb 16 The Total Number of the House of Representatives (continued)
57 1788 Feb 19 The Alleged Tendency of the New Plan to Elevate the Few at the Expense of the Many Considered in Connection with
Representation
58 1788 Feb 20 Objection That The Number of Members Will Not Be Augmented as the Progress of Population Demands Considered
59 1788 Feb 22 Concerning the Power of Congress to Regulate the Election of Members
60 1788 Feb 23 Concerning the Power of Congress to Regulate the Election of Members (continued)
61 1788 Feb 26 Concerning the Power of Congress to Regulate the Election of Members (continued)
62 1788 Feb 27 The Senate
63 1788 Mar 1 The Senate (continued)
64 1788 Mar 5 The Powers of the Senate
65 1788 Mar 7 The Powers of the Senate (continued)
66 1788 Mar 8 Objections to the Power of the Senate To Set as a Court for Impeachments Further Considered
67 1788 Mar 11 The Executive Department
68 1788 Mar 12 The Mode of Electing the President
69 1788 Mar 14 The Real Character of the Executive
70 1788 Mar 15 The Executive Department Further Considered
71 1788 Mar 18 The Duration in Office of the Executive
72 1788 Mar 19 The Same Subject Continued, and Re-Eligibility of the Executive Considered
73 1788 Mar 21 The Provision For The Support of the Executive, and the Veto Power
74 1788 Mar 25 The Command of the Military and Naval Forces, and the Pardoning Power of the Executive
75 1788 Mar 26 The Treaty-Making Power of the Executive
76 1788 Apr 1 The Appointing Power of the Executive
77 1788 Apr 2 The Appointing Power Continued and Other Powers of the Executive Considered
78 1788 Jun 14 The Judiciary Department
79 1788 Jun 18 The Judiciary Continued
80 1788 Jun 21 The Powers of the Judiciary
81 1788 Jun 25 The Judiciary Continued, and the Distribution of the Judicial Authority
82 1788 Jul 2 The Judiciary Continued
83 1788 Jul 5 The Judiciary Continued in Relation to Trial by Jury
84 1788 Jul 16 Certain General and Miscellaneous Objections to the Constitution Considered and Answered
85 1788 Aug 13 Concluding Remarks
# Date Title
1 1787 Oct 27 General Introduction
2 1787 Oct 31 Concerning Dangers from Foreign Force and Influence
3 1787 Nov 3 Concerning Dangers from Foreign Force and Influence (continued)
4 1787 Nov 7 Concerning Dangers from Foreign Force and Influence (continued)
5 1787 Nov 10 Concerning Dangers from Foreign Force and Influence (continued)
6 1787 Nov 14 Concerning Dangers from Dissensions Between the States
7 1787 Nov 15 Concerning Dangers from Dissensions Between the States (continued) and Particular Causes Enumerated
8 1787 Nov 20 Consequences of Hostilities Between the States
9 1787 Nov 21 The Utility of the Union as a Safeguard Against Domestic Faction and Insurrection
10 1787 Nov 22 The Utility of the Union as a Safeguard Against Domestic Faction and Insurrection (continued)
11 1787 Nov 24 The Utility of the Union in Respect to Commercial Relations and a Navy
12 1787 Nov 27 The Utility of the Union In Respect to Revenue
13 1787 Nov 28 Advantage of the Union in Respect to Economy in Government
14 1787 Nov 30 Objections to the Proposed Constitution From Extent of Territory Answered
15 1787 Dec 1 Insufficiency of the Present Confederation to Preserve the Union
16 1787 Dec 4 Insufficiency of the Present Confederation to Preserve the Union (continued)
17 1787 Dec 5 Insufficiency of the Present Confederation to Preserve the Union (continued)
18 1787 Dec 7 Insufficiency of the Present Confederation to Preserve the Union (continued)
19 1787 Dec 8 Insufficiency of the Present Confederation to Preserve the Union (continued)
20 1787 Dec 11 Insufficiency of the Present Confederation to Preserve the Union (continued)
21 1787 Dec 12 Other Defects of the Present Confederation
22 1787 Dec 14 Other Defects of the Present Confederation (continued)
23 1787 Dec 18 Necessity of a Government as Energetic as the One Proposed to the Preservation of the Union
24 1787 Dec 19 Powers Necessary to the Common Defense Further Considered
25 1787 Dec 21 Powers Necessary to the Common Defense Further Considered (continued)
26 1787 Dec 22 Idea of Restraining the Legislative Authority in Regard to the Common Defense Considered
27 1787 Dec 25 Idea of Restraining the Legislative Authority in Regard to the Common Defense Considered (continued)
28 1787 Dec 26 Idea of Restraining the Legislative Authority in Regard to the Common Defense Considered (continued)
29 1788 Jan 9 Concerning the Militia
30 1787 Dec 28 Concerning the General Power of Taxation
31 1788 Jan 1 Concerning the General Power of Taxation (continued)
32 1788 Jan 2 Concerning the General Power of Taxation (continued)
33 1788 Jan 2 Concerning the General Power of Taxation (continued)
34 1788 Jan 5 Concerning the General Power of Taxation (continued)
35 1788 Jan 5 Concerning the General Power of Taxation (continued)
36 1788 Jan 8 Concerning the General Power of Taxation (continued)
37 1788 Jan 11 Concerning the Difficulties of the Convention in Devising a Proper Form of Government
38 1788 Jan 12 The Same Subject Continued, and the Incoherence of the Objections to the New Plan Exposed
39 1788 Jan 16 Conformity of the Plan to Republican Principles
40 1788 Jan 18 On the Powers of the Convention to Form a Mixed Government Examined and Sustained
41 1788 Jan 19 General View of the Powers Conferred by The Constitution
42 1788 Jan 22 The Powers Conferred by the Constitution Further Considered
43 1788 Jan 23 The Powers Conferred by the Constitution Further Considered (continued)
44 1788 Jan 25 Restrictions on the Authority of the Several States
45 1788 Jan 26 Alleged Danger From the Powers of the Union to the State Governments Considered
46 1788 Jan 29 The Influence of the State and Federal Governments Compared
47 1788 Jan 30 The Particular Structure of the New Government and the Distribution of Power Among Its Different Parts
48 1788 Feb 1 These Departments Should Not Be So Far Separated as to Have No Constitutional Control Over Each Other
49 1788 Feb 2 Method of Guarding Against the Encroachments of Any One Department of Government by Appealing to the People
Through a Convention
50 1788 Feb 5 Periodical Appeals to the People Considered
51 1788 Feb 6 The Structure of the Government Must Furnish the Proper Checks and Balances Between the Different Departments
52 1788 Feb 8 The House of Representatives
53 1788 Feb 9 The House of Representatives (continued)
54 1788 Feb 12 Apportionment of Members of the House of Representatives Among the States
55 1788 Feb 13 The Total Number of the House of Representatives
56 1788 Feb 16 The Total Number of the House of Representatives (continued)
57 1788 Feb 19 The Alleged Tendency of the New Plan to Elevate the Few at the Expense of the Many Considered in Connection with
Representation
58 1788 Feb 20 Objection That The Number of Members Will Not Be Augmented as the Progress of Population Demands Considered
59 1788 Feb 22 Concerning the Power of Congress to Regulate the Election of Members
60 1788 Feb 23 Concerning the Power of Congress to Regulate the Election of Members (continued)
61 1788 Feb 26 Concerning the Power of Congress to Regulate the Election of Members (continued)
62 1788 Feb 27 The Senate
63 1788 Mar 1 The Senate (continued)
64 1788 Mar 5 The Powers of the Senate
65 1788 Mar 7 The Powers of the Senate (continued)
66 1788 Mar 8 Objections to the Power of the Senate To Set as a Court for Impeachments Further Considered
67 1788 Mar 11 The Executive Department
68 1788 Mar 12 The Mode of Electing the President
69 1788 Mar 14 The Real Character of the Executive
70 1788 Mar 15 The Executive Department Further Considered
71 1788 Mar 18 The Duration in Office of the Executive
72 1788 Mar 19 The Same Subject Continued, and Re-Eligibility of the Executive Considered
73 1788 Mar 21 The Provision For The Support of the Executive, and the Veto Power
74 1788 Mar 25 The Command of the Military and Naval Forces, and the Pardoning Power of the Executive
75 1788 Mar 26 The Treaty-Making Power of the Executive
76 1788 Apr 1 The Appointing Power of the Executive
77 1788 Apr 2 The Appointing Power Continued and Other Powers of the Executive Considered
78 1788 Jun 14 The Judiciary Department
79 1788 Jun 18 The Judiciary Continued
80 1788 Jun 21 The Powers of the Judiciary
81 1788 Jun 25 The Judiciary Continued, and the Distribution of the Judicial Authority
82 1788 Jul 2 The Judiciary Continued
83 1788 Jul 5 The Judiciary Continued in Relation to Trial by Jury
84 1788 Jul 16 Certain General and Miscellaneous Objections to the Constitution Considered and Answered
85 1788 Aug 13 Concluding Remarks
Auxiliary Precautions
A dependence on the people to utilize their vote is, no doubt, the primary control on the government; but experience has taught mankind the necessity of auxiliary precautions. James Madison Federalist No. 51, February 8, 1788
In the example above Madison says that if you cannot vote a person out of office or if that person’s actions are extreme enough or a danger to the Constitution itself then the government can have the power to punish a member by censure, reprimand, condemnation, reduction of seniority, or fine and in extreme measures expel them from their seat in congress, this is what is meant by auxiliary precautions.
What if their actions are consistent with what is considered normal by the majority of government but inconstant and contrary with the wishes of their constituents?
Take for example. James Clyburn, the third-ranking Democrat in the House of Representatives, Has stated that “There’s nothing in the Constitution that says that the federal government has right to do most of the stuff done in congress.” Very blatant examples of this is the Patriot Act; it violated the and forth amendment The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures and the sixth amendment In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, you could use for example the Health care bill that violates the ninth amendment The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people, and the tenth The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.
Does the definition of government ethics need strengthening, to include what was once considered unnecessary, what was the center peace of our republic the very contract of conduct between the Federal Government and the States? Should it be necessary for the States to challenge every bill passed by congress to the Supreme Court at a cost of thousands of man hours and millions of dollars?
At one time in our history the role of the Senate was to protect the rights of the States. As Ambassadors representing the State government and the people of their State, the Senate’s function was to filter every bill passed by the House of Representatives to ensure that bill was (1) Constitutional (2) Was not placing an undue burden on the State. (3) Did not weaken the liberties of the people of the nation.
The State could control their Ambassadors by recalling them to answer to the State Governor and Government, when their actions were considered a threat to the Constitution or the State.
State Senators were not controlled by lobbyist or special interest. Contrary to what was said in press in 1913 when the Seventeenth Amendment was passed. The very reason it was passed was to give lobbyist control over the Senate. This is perfectly evident today.
Dear Sir,
I wrote you a letter yesterday which you are free to use as you please. This letter contains matters not intended for the public eye.
I see, as you do, and with the deepest affliction, the rapid strides with which the federal branch of our Government is advancing toward the removal of all the rights reserved to the States, and the consolidation in itself of all powers, foreign and domestic; by constructions which, if legitimate, leave no limits to their power.
Take together the decisions of the federal court, the doctrines of the President, and the misconstructions by the legislature of the federal branch, and it is evident, that the three ruling branches intend to strip the State authorities of the powers reserved by them and to exercise themselves all functions foreign and domestic.
Under the power to regulate commerce, they claim, aided by some deceptive reasoning on the words "general welfare" a right to do, not only the acts which are specifically enumerated in and permitted by the constitutions, but whatsoever they shall think, or pretend will be for the general welfare.
What steps can we take to help preserve the Constitution? Try to reason and argue with the Federal representatives chosen by ourselves? You might as well reason and argue with the marble columns encircling them.
The States should be watchful to note every violation of their rights; to denounce them in the clearest possible terms; to protest against wrongs to which our present submission shall not be considered an acknowledgment of precedents or right, but as a temporary yielding on our part. This is the course which I think safest and best for now.
To: Governor William B. Giles of Virginia on December 26, 1825
From: THOMAS JEFFERSON (retired)
Mr. Jefferson’s letter was written just thirty seven years after the constitutions ratification.
Ambition must be made to counteract ambition
“In a free government the security for civil rights must be the same as that for religious rights”. First and foremost the government must respect the liberty of personal freedom with as much respect as it would have for the religious freedom of its citizens. It is hard to visualize that when living in the most heavily regulated period in our history
The Utah Constitution states: "Frequent recurrence to fundamental principles is essential to the security of individual rights and the perpetuity of free government."
As a task force now assembles to review Utah's Government Records Access and Management Act (GRAMA), we consider it appropriate to discuss, in some detail, the fundamental principles at stake.
James Madison, often called the father of the Constitution, was the first to elucidate clearly the principle of a compound constitutional republic in Federalist Paper No. 51, an essay written to advocate ratification of the Constitution. In that essay he wrote:
"If men were angels, no government would be necessary. If angels were to govern men, neither external nor internal controls on government would be necessary. In framing a government which is to be administered by men over men, the great difficulty lies in this: You must first enable the government to control the governed; and in the next place, oblige it to control itself.
"A dependence on the people is no doubt the primary control on the government; but experience has taught mankind the necessity of auxiliary precautions."
Madison's phrase, "dependence on the people" refers to public opinion as mediated through elections that hold representatives accountable as agents of the people.
His phrase "auxiliary precautions" refers to what are commonly called checks and balances. In the specific historical context of constitutional ratification, he was discussing federalism and the separation of powers. But given his overall theory, "auxiliary precautions" could refer to any institutional arrangement specifically designed to control the abuses of government.
Constitutional rights were some of the first "auxiliary precautions" used in the early American republic. Rights protected citizens from government overreach.
Yale University scholar Stephen Skowronek has shown how elections and rights led American government in the 19th century to organize around competitive political parties and accessible courts.
In the 20th century, however, American government added significantly to its administrative capacity, attempting to regulate everything from air quality to zoning, and to provide for the young (through education) and the old (through income security). Government also increased its capacities in national security and law enforcement. The resultant bureaucracies were often deliberately insulated from elections and litigation.
You could make a strong argument that the financial crisis was caused by economic models and therefore by economic PhDs. These people are not characterized by their skepticism of their own ability to understand complex systems. If engineers built bridges like economists built models, people would regularly be falling through broken bridges.
Should the American people have their way? When the government was described then implemented by the Constitution there were checks and balances built into its framework.
The idea was to hold in check each part of government so one would not overrun the other.
The people’s house or the House of Representatives was the voice of the citizens. This was the most powerful of the branches of government IMO. It had the right to legislate or right bills appropriate money levy taxes.
It did not take long before the people discovered that the Senate who approved or rejected their bills would not give them the free hand to do as they please. To fix the problem the people made the senate a house controled by the people. Now they could spend and tax and make all the laws the wanted without the heavy hand of the Senate.
Perhaps we have found the enemy and it is us.
"Public virtue cannot exist in a nation without private, and public virtue is the only foundation of republics." -John Adams
Public virtue is one of what the American Founders called the Four Foundations of Freedom.
The Four Foundations of Freedom are, in order of importance according to most of the Founders:
Private virtue means being a person of integrity; being honest in your dealings with others, being faithful in your duties to your family, controlling your appetites, etc.
Public virtue means to voluntarily sacrifice personal benefit for the good of society. For example, George Washington served two terms as President even when, as he was accepting the post, he wrote that it "would be the greatest sacrifice of my personal feelings and wishes that ever I have been called upon to make."
Contrary to our modern conception of education widespread education to the Founders didn't mean job training; it meant classical, liberal education designed to teach individuals how to think, not what to think (see A Thomas Jefferson Education by Oliver DeMille).
And finally, auxiliary precautions are a society's forms of government that ideally protect life, liberty, property, and the pursuit of happiness. Auxiliary precautions include Legitimate Foundation, Legitimate Authority, Legitimate Role, Separation of Powers, Checks, Balances, Federalism, Written Constitution, Enumerated Limited Powers, Periodic Elections, Electoral College and Factionalization.
If no one ever thought of such a right as that of privacy, until over 100 years after the adoption of the Constitution, the Court can hardly be appealing to the Constitution in basing any decision on such a right.‘ The Court must be importing such rights into the Constitution, and by so doing is making law'.
A broken check on power.
In the example above Madison says that if you cannot vote a person out of office or if that person’s actions are extreme enough or a danger to the Constitution itself then the government can have the power to punish a member by censure, reprimand, condemnation, reduction of seniority, or fine and in extreme measures expel them from their seat in congress, this is what is meant by auxiliary precautions.
What if their actions are consistent with what is considered normal by the majority of government but inconstant and contrary with the wishes of their constituents?
Take for example. James Clyburn, the third-ranking Democrat in the House of Representatives, Has stated that “There’s nothing in the Constitution that says that the federal government has right to do most of the stuff done in congress.” Very blatant examples of this is the Patriot Act; it violated the and forth amendment The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures and the sixth amendment In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, you could use for example the Health care bill that violates the ninth amendment The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people, and the tenth The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.
Does the definition of government ethics need strengthening, to include what was once considered unnecessary, what was the center peace of our republic the very contract of conduct between the Federal Government and the States? Should it be necessary for the States to challenge every bill passed by congress to the Supreme Court at a cost of thousands of man hours and millions of dollars?
At one time in our history the role of the Senate was to protect the rights of the States. As Ambassadors representing the State government and the people of their State, the Senate’s function was to filter every bill passed by the House of Representatives to ensure that bill was (1) Constitutional (2) Was not placing an undue burden on the State. (3) Did not weaken the liberties of the people of the nation.
The State could control their Ambassadors by recalling them to answer to the State Governor and Government, when their actions were considered a threat to the Constitution or the State.
State Senators were not controlled by lobbyist or special interest. Contrary to what was said in press in 1913 when the Seventeenth Amendment was passed. The very reason it was passed was to give lobbyist control over the Senate. This is perfectly evident today.
Dear Sir,
I wrote you a letter yesterday which you are free to use as you please. This letter contains matters not intended for the public eye.
I see, as you do, and with the deepest affliction, the rapid strides with which the federal branch of our Government is advancing toward the removal of all the rights reserved to the States, and the consolidation in itself of all powers, foreign and domestic; by constructions which, if legitimate, leave no limits to their power.
Take together the decisions of the federal court, the doctrines of the President, and the misconstructions by the legislature of the federal branch, and it is evident, that the three ruling branches intend to strip the State authorities of the powers reserved by them and to exercise themselves all functions foreign and domestic.
Under the power to regulate commerce, they claim, aided by some deceptive reasoning on the words "general welfare" a right to do, not only the acts which are specifically enumerated in and permitted by the constitutions, but whatsoever they shall think, or pretend will be for the general welfare.
What steps can we take to help preserve the Constitution? Try to reason and argue with the Federal representatives chosen by ourselves? You might as well reason and argue with the marble columns encircling them.
The States should be watchful to note every violation of their rights; to denounce them in the clearest possible terms; to protest against wrongs to which our present submission shall not be considered an acknowledgment of precedents or right, but as a temporary yielding on our part. This is the course which I think safest and best for now.
To: Governor William B. Giles of Virginia on December 26, 1825
From: THOMAS JEFFERSON (retired)
Mr. Jefferson’s letter was written just thirty seven years after the constitutions ratification.
Ambition must be made to counteract ambition
“In a free government the security for civil rights must be the same as that for religious rights”. First and foremost the government must respect the liberty of personal freedom with as much respect as it would have for the religious freedom of its citizens. It is hard to visualize that when living in the most heavily regulated period in our history
The Utah Constitution states: "Frequent recurrence to fundamental principles is essential to the security of individual rights and the perpetuity of free government."
As a task force now assembles to review Utah's Government Records Access and Management Act (GRAMA), we consider it appropriate to discuss, in some detail, the fundamental principles at stake.
James Madison, often called the father of the Constitution, was the first to elucidate clearly the principle of a compound constitutional republic in Federalist Paper No. 51, an essay written to advocate ratification of the Constitution. In that essay he wrote:
"If men were angels, no government would be necessary. If angels were to govern men, neither external nor internal controls on government would be necessary. In framing a government which is to be administered by men over men, the great difficulty lies in this: You must first enable the government to control the governed; and in the next place, oblige it to control itself.
"A dependence on the people is no doubt the primary control on the government; but experience has taught mankind the necessity of auxiliary precautions."
Madison's phrase, "dependence on the people" refers to public opinion as mediated through elections that hold representatives accountable as agents of the people.
His phrase "auxiliary precautions" refers to what are commonly called checks and balances. In the specific historical context of constitutional ratification, he was discussing federalism and the separation of powers. But given his overall theory, "auxiliary precautions" could refer to any institutional arrangement specifically designed to control the abuses of government.
Constitutional rights were some of the first "auxiliary precautions" used in the early American republic. Rights protected citizens from government overreach.
Yale University scholar Stephen Skowronek has shown how elections and rights led American government in the 19th century to organize around competitive political parties and accessible courts.
In the 20th century, however, American government added significantly to its administrative capacity, attempting to regulate everything from air quality to zoning, and to provide for the young (through education) and the old (through income security). Government also increased its capacities in national security and law enforcement. The resultant bureaucracies were often deliberately insulated from elections and litigation.
You could make a strong argument that the financial crisis was caused by economic models and therefore by economic PhDs. These people are not characterized by their skepticism of their own ability to understand complex systems. If engineers built bridges like economists built models, people would regularly be falling through broken bridges.
Should the American people have their way? When the government was described then implemented by the Constitution there were checks and balances built into its framework.
The idea was to hold in check each part of government so one would not overrun the other.
The people’s house or the House of Representatives was the voice of the citizens. This was the most powerful of the branches of government IMO. It had the right to legislate or right bills appropriate money levy taxes.
It did not take long before the people discovered that the Senate who approved or rejected their bills would not give them the free hand to do as they please. To fix the problem the people made the senate a house controled by the people. Now they could spend and tax and make all the laws the wanted without the heavy hand of the Senate.
Perhaps we have found the enemy and it is us.
"Public virtue cannot exist in a nation without private, and public virtue is the only foundation of republics." -John Adams
Public virtue is one of what the American Founders called the Four Foundations of Freedom.
The Four Foundations of Freedom are, in order of importance according to most of the Founders:
- Private Virtue
- Public Virtue
- Widespread Education
- Auxiliary Precautions
Private virtue means being a person of integrity; being honest in your dealings with others, being faithful in your duties to your family, controlling your appetites, etc.
Public virtue means to voluntarily sacrifice personal benefit for the good of society. For example, George Washington served two terms as President even when, as he was accepting the post, he wrote that it "would be the greatest sacrifice of my personal feelings and wishes that ever I have been called upon to make."
Contrary to our modern conception of education widespread education to the Founders didn't mean job training; it meant classical, liberal education designed to teach individuals how to think, not what to think (see A Thomas Jefferson Education by Oliver DeMille).
And finally, auxiliary precautions are a society's forms of government that ideally protect life, liberty, property, and the pursuit of happiness. Auxiliary precautions include Legitimate Foundation, Legitimate Authority, Legitimate Role, Separation of Powers, Checks, Balances, Federalism, Written Constitution, Enumerated Limited Powers, Periodic Elections, Electoral College and Factionalization.
If no one ever thought of such a right as that of privacy, until over 100 years after the adoption of the Constitution, the Court can hardly be appealing to the Constitution in basing any decision on such a right.‘ The Court must be importing such rights into the Constitution, and by so doing is making law'.
A broken check on power.